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NO MORE DRAMA? THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
POTENTIAL FUTURE OF RETROACTIVE
TRANSFERS OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to October 5, 2007, retroactive license transfers were,
theoretically, a valid way to rectify past infringement: once in
possession of a retroactive license, a licensee became insulated
against any other possible co-authors' infringement suits.' Like
other facets of the law, this practice of allowing retroactive
licenses had the potential to work against those the law is supposed
to protect - the original author or authors of the work. But did it
really result in rewarding infringers and punishing less greedy coauthors? And what of the impact for future court decisions on this
matter?
This article examines the recent holding of the Second Circuit in
Davis v. Blige in light of prior district court decisions, most of
which stand contrary to this holding.2 Part II gives the reader a
proper background on the basics of copyright law, including an indepth look into exclusive and non-exclusive licenses, as well as the
rights that correspond to each type of license. It then traces the
evolution of the retroactive license, examining those cases that
found the mechanism to fit in perfectly with the Copyright Act of
1976. The article then shifts gears to look at the few cases that
found retroactive licenses invalid, which leads to the discussion in
Part III of the Davis v. Blige decision and the Second Circuit's
rationale behind its holding. Notably, a description of the policy
reasons offered by the court, in contrast to the lower court's
holding, is included, as this reason is one of the driving forces
behind the court's holding.
1. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007).
2. Id.
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The article then closes with a discussion of the potential impact
of the Second Circuit's holding nationwide, including the pros and
cons of the new rule. The article concludes by offering examples
of when this rule should and should not be applied and suggests a
different holding that would eliminate the need for such line
drawing with regard to retroactive licenses.

II.BACKGROUND

A. The Basics: Retroactive License Transfers and the Copyright
Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("the Act") is silent on retroactive
In fact, the Act defines "transfer of copyright
transfers.
ownership" as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of
any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or
not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
Thus, it became the courts' duty to
nonexclusive license."3
interpret the validity of a retroactive transfer.
A creative work is entitled to copyright protection when it is
fixed in a "tangible medium of expression." 4 Registration of the
work is not necessary, but is a prerequisite to sue another for
infringement.5 Under the Act, if more than one person aids in the
creation of the work then they are co-authors and thereby coowners in the work, each having the same set of rights to the
work. 6 Co-owners to a copyright may not sue each other for
infringement as long as each party is properly using, and not
exceeding, his right. 7 A co-owner may subsequently transfer only
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4. Id. § 102.
5. Id. § 411.
6. Henry L. Self, Settlement of Infringement Claims by Copyright Coowners, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 65, 66-67 (2004).

7. Davis, 505 F.3d at 98. "An owner may not, however, convey the interests
of his fellow co-owners without their express written consent, even if the
transferee has no notice of the non-consenting owners' interest." Id. (citing
Crosney v. Edward Small Prods., 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1942)). "An

owner may give a license to someone to exploit the work in some way, provided
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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his interest in the joint work to a third party, absent any agreement
to the contrary, and subject to the general requirements of a valid
copyright transfer.8

Two general types of licenses are available for transfer from a
co-owner to a third party: exclusive licenses and non-exclusive
licenses.9 Exclusive licenses act just as they sound, by transferring
any or all of the exclusive rights" of a work to a third party for
that party's exclusive use." Granting an exclusive license requires

the consent of all co-owners of the copyright since the co-owners
no longer will be entitled to use whatever exclusive right they
license away, and one owner may not transfer more than his share
of the "bundle."' 2 Non-exclusive rights, on the other hand, may be
granted to more than one third party, and do not require the
agreement of all co-owners since the co-owner making the transfer
is only signing over his portion of the "bundle" of rights."' This

he owns that particular copyright interest." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106).
8. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
6.11 (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER].
9. Davis, 505 F.3d at 99.
10. Id. The exclusive rights are the rights to do the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106.
11. Davis, 505 F.3d at 99.
12. Id.
13. 1 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.11.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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non-exclusive license then allows the other co-owners to retain
their original interest in the work because it "does not diminish the
value of the copyright to the co-owners."' 4 A further difference
between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses is the way in which
they may be transferred to third parties: exclusive licenses must be
in writing, while non-exclusive licenses may be granted orally or
may even be implied from conduct.15
There is some debate on the ability of a licensee to sublicense
his rights. It is generally understood that non-exclusive licenses do
not permit the licensee to grant any sublicenses; 6 however,
whether this is the same with an exclusive license has been a point
of contention among the circuits. Probably the most notable
decision was Gardnerv. Nike, Inc., 7 where the court held that an
exclusive license did not allow a licensee to transfer8 its rights to
another party without the original licensor's consent. 1
In Gardner, Sony entered into a licensing agreement with
defendant Nike for a cartoon character created by Nike.' 9 The
agreement granted Sony the "exclusive, perpetual, worldwide right
...to use [the character] on and in the packaging of ...records..
,in publicity, advertising and.., exploitation of the [r]ecords, in
television programs or motion pictures embodying the [music] ...
on the records, on educational material and on clothing . . . ," but
made no mention about Sony's right to sublicense its rights, which
is precisely what Sony ended up doing.2" Sony assigned all of its
rights under the exclusive license to the plaintiff, Gardner, on a
quitclaim basis.2 In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit

14. Davis, 505 F.3d at 101.
15. Landsted Homes, Inc. v. Sherman, 305 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (citing I.A.E. Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 1996)).
16. Leicester v. Warner Bros., No. CV95-4058-HLH, 1998 WL 34016724, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 1998). Since the owner of a non-exclusive license

possesses only certain rights to the work, it appears that the licensor must
specifically grant the licensee the right to further sublicense the work to a third
party. Superbrace, Inc. v. Tidwell, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404, 407 (Ct. App. 2004).
17. Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002).

18. Id. at 779.
19. Id. at 776.
20. Id.
21. Id. Sony thus relinquished its claim to the cartoon character and, under

the agreement with Gardner, was to receive a share of the proceeds resulting
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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found that § 201(d)(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976 does not allow
for a licensee or owner of an exclusive right to further sublicense
that right.22 Rather, the court found that the language explicitly
limits the rights of an owner of exclusive rights.23 The Ninth
Circuit elaborated further that its decision was partially influenced
by policy considerations. 4 Specifically, it recognized the need to
balance the interests of free alienability and divisibility with the
owners' and creators' rights and ability to control the work.25
Several courts have disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976. In Traicoff v. Digital
Media, Inc., the Southern District of Indiana found the Gardner
court's rationale "unpersuasive," stating that "[a] natural reading
of the Act's language leads to the conclusion that exclusive
licensees, as copyright owners of their exclusive rights, are free
under the Act to transfer those rights to third parties."2 6 This case
involved a former employee, the plaintiff Traicoff, suing his
former employer for copyright infringement, breach of contract,
and fraud resulting from the employer granting its rights in a
from Gardner's use of the character. Id. The district court decided that Gardner
lacked standing to bring suit because the Copyright Act of 1976 "did not allow
Sony to transfer its rights under the exclusive license without Nike's consent"
and thus dismissed the action. Id. at 777.
22. Id. at 780.
23. Gardner, 279 F.3d at 780. Section 201(d)(2) of the Act states, in part,
"The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that
right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by
this title." 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006). The Gardner court found the
"protection and remedies" part of the statute limiting, but does not describe how
or why it is limiting except for a brief analysis of Section 201(d)(2) as it limits §
201(d)(1). Gardner, 279 F.3d at 780. A more convincing argument comes
when the court concludes that had Congress intended to allow an exclusive
copyright licensee to transfer its rights, it would have addressed it in the 1976
Act and "the limiting 'protection and remedies' language of Section 210(d)(2)
indicates that the state of the law remains unchanged [from the original 1909
Copyright Act]. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 8.
24. Gardner,279 F.3d at 780.
25. Id. at 781. "In order to reach the balance between these interests, we
hold that, under the 1976 Act, an exclusive licensee has the burden of obtaining
the licensor's consent before it may assign its rights, absent explicit contractual
language to the contrary." Id.
26. Traicoff v. Digital Media, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 872, 877 (S.D. Ind.
2006).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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software training program to a third party.2 7 The plaintiff had
made audio recordings that were used in the software training
programs, but had granted his employer the right to use those
recordings in exchange for 50,000 shares of stock. 2' There was an
explicit anti-assignment clause in the agreement which led to the
breach of contract claim by the plaintiff when the defendant
transferred to a third party the right to sell the software program. 9
In its two-pronged holding, the district court (1) disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit in holding that the Copyright Act does not prevent an
exclusive licensee from transferring the exclusive right, in whole
or in part, to another party, and (2) found that because the antiassignment provision did not explicitly prohibit the assignment of
rights, duties, or both, the contract did not prevent the employerdefendant from assigning its rights to a third party.30 Gardner was
also distinguished by Faulkner v. National Geographic Society,
where the court found the Ninth Circuit case distinguishable
because it did not involve a copyright in a collective work owned
by the publisher, but rather "concerned the classic situation of a
company sublicensing its rights to a cartoon character under an
exclusive licensing agreement." 3 ' Gardner,however, has yet to be
overruled and thus remains controlling authority in the Ninth
Circuit and persuasive authority throughout the other United States
circuits.

27. Id. at 874-75.

28. Id. at 874.
29. Id. at 874, 879.
30. Id. at 879-81. The court cites other courts that have criticized the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Gardner. Id. at 877 (citing In re Golden Books Family
Entm't, Inc., 269 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (criticizing the district court
decision affirmed in Gardner, and holding that exclusive licensees are free to
transfer their licenses without the consent of the original copyright owner); In re
Valley Media, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 135 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ("Exclusive
licenses grant the licensee a property fight in the copyright that is freely
transferable ....");In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The holder of the exclusive license is entitled to all of the
rights and protections of the copyright owner to the extent of the license.
Accordingly, the licensee under an exclusive license may freely transfer his
rights....")).
31. Faulkner v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 294 F. Supp. 2d 523, 546 n.112
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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B. The Way Things Were: How the Past Was Sold
Now, enter the retroactive license. This sneaky creation preys
on the lawsuit insulation between co-owners that was previously
mentioned by allowing, in the present day, a license transfer
agreement to be drawn up, transferring rights to a creation starting
from some point in the past.3" Thus, for example, if an infringer
was stuck with a copyright infringement lawsuit, he could,
theoretically, approach a co-owner of the original, copyrighted
work and purchase a non-exclusive retroactive license, thus
ensuring that the plaintiff/co-owner would be barred from
continuing with the lawsuit.3 3 Other industries plainly recognize
the existence of retroactive licenses. Graphic artists, for example,
abide by a schedule of fees that in turn grant an unauthorized user
a retroactive license.34 Provided that the unauthorized use was a
mistake and not willful infringement, the artist "can resolve the
problem by paying a reasonable license fee of two to three times
the normal fee, . . . thus avoiding the costly and protracted
business of a federal copyright case." 35 The photography industry
also acknowledges retroactive licenses in the same way as the
graphic art community, by using a sliding scale for determining a
payout in a case of infringement and further acknowledging that
"[flees for retroactive licenses are greater than those charged for
prospective licenses."36
The use of retroactive licenses was upheld by the court in
Silberstein v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., a case in which the
plaintiff, in 1999, was struck by an idea to create an animated
squirrel/rat combination animal - a "Sqrat" - after allegedly seeing
such a creature in a New York City park."7 The term "Sqrat" was
later registered by the plaintiff as a word mark, and the plaintiff
commissioned an artist to come up with an animated version of the
32. Self, supra note 5, at 72.
33. Id.
34. Stehrenberger v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d
466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
35. Id.
36. Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620, 632 (S.D. Tex.
2007).
37. Silberstein v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 616, 619
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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creature.38 Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the artist actually relied
heavily on a clip-art drawing of a beaver, which was originally
created by Smart Designs, Inc. 39 About the same time the plaintiff
was promoting her creation, Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation ("Fox") was producing the animated film Ice Age,
which had an animal character named "Scrat," who was, in the
court's words, "a rodential being with bulging eyes, a long snout,
saber teeth, a raccoon-like striped tail, and an anxious mien."40
The plaintiff alleged that Fox's "Scrat" was a knockoff of her own
"Sqrat" creation - at least until both sides realized the existence of
Smart Designs' beaver cartoon." Upon this realization, there was
a "flurry of activity on both sides:" Fox purchased a retroactive
license from Smart Designs' successor, Digital Art Solutions, and
the plaintiff obtained a retroactive license from the artist who
created the beaver cartoon as an independent contractor.42
In ruling that both the plaintiff and defendant had the right to use
the beaver cartoon (and their respective "Scrat"/"Sqrat" derivative
animations), the court found the retroactive transfers valid and that
Fox was therefore protected from the plaintiffs infringement
lawsuit since "[t]here can be no copyright infringement action by a
holder of a copyright against a licensee of another holder of the
38. Id. The court notes that the plaintiff "was not the first person to develop
the concept of a squirrel-rat hybrid, or to use the word 'sqrat,' a composite of
the words 'squirrel' and 'rat,' to signify such a creature." Id. at 620. However,
the plaintiff appeared to be the first to secure legal protection for the name. Id.
39. Id. at 622.
40. Id. at 621. The plaintiff, in an attempt to generate interest in her creation,
registered a website (http://www.sqrat.com), attended a trade show for buyers
and sellers of animated creatures, distributed a "media alert," and created
promotional items such as t-shirts and stickers with the Sqrat logo. Id.
41. Id. at 621-22. Defendants' counsel came across the existence of Smart
Designs' CD-ROM of clip art images which contained an image dubbed
"Beaver Cartoon # 2." Id. at 622. The court called "Beaver Cartoon # 2" a
virtual "dead ringer" for plaintiff's "Sqrat," finding that the plaintiffs artist
modified the Beaver cartoon in a few respects. Id. "[T]he beaver's tail was
replaced with a tail that the artist intended to be a squirrel's tail; the ears were
made rounder; whiskers were added; the artist allegedly 'played with the teeth a
little' ..,and Sqrat holds a sign reading 'SQRAT."' Id.
42. Id. at 622. Digital Art Solutions and the independent contractor each
owned one-half ownership of the Beaver copyright as a result of an arbitration
agreement between the two parties. Id. at 622-23.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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same copyright."43
The court noted that while the original
physical elements of the plaintiff's "Sqrat" would be the only
protectable elements of the creation, these elements were not
infringed upon by the defendant, as "there is virtually nothing
similar about the two characters apart from their both being hybrid
rodents.""
Lone Wolf McQuade Associates v. CBS, Inc. also upheld the use
of retroactive licenses to cure past infringement.45 In Lone Wolf,
the plaintiff alleged that CBS's television show, "Walker, Texas
Ranger," violated its rights in the movie, "Lone Wolf McQuade."4 6
After initially joining the plaintiff in the action, Orion Pictures
Corporation ("Orion"), which owned certain rights to the film
"Lone Wolf McQuade," granted CBS a retroactive license in a
settlement agreement, permitting the network to use "Lone Wolf
McQuade" in connection with its television show, "Walker, Texas
Ranger."47 Orion obtained its rights in the movie from 1818
Productions, Inc., and subsequently conveyed to the plaintiff in
this case "'all right, title and interest in and to all copyrights in the
Film,"' but reserved for itself "'any interest whatsoever in and to.
. . [a]ny television series rights, so-called television 'special'
rights, remake or sequel rights, or any other ancillary rights and/or

43. Silberstein, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 629. The court stated,

The retroactivity of the licensing agreement between [Digital
Art Solutions, the successor to Smart Designs] and Fox has no
necessary effect on its power to immunize Fox against claims
of infringement of the Beaver copyright ... [additionally], the
retroactive conveyance of [the artist's] Beaver copyright to
Silberstein is no impediment to her creation of Sqrat as a
derivative work based on the Beaver.
Id. The court reasoned, "the owner of a copyright may create a derivative work
based on the underlying copyrighted work." Id. at 629 (citing 17 U.S.C. §
106(2)). Furthermore, the court plainly cites "[a] retroactive license can cure
past infringements." Id. (quoting Lone Wolf McQuade Assocs. v. CBS Inc.,
961 F. Supp. 587, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).

44. Id. at 630-31. The plaintiff failed to show that a "substantial similarity"
between the two animated characters existed to establish a genuine issue of
material fact. Id.
45. Lone Wolf McQuade Assocs. v. CBS Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 598
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).

46. Id. at 590.
47. Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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allied rights ....""'48
In 1993, CBS broadcast a made-for-TV movie, "Walker: Texas
Ranger, One Riot, One Ranger," which spawned the weekly series
"Walker, Texas Ranger," both of which starred Chuck Norris.4 9
The court found that while a reasonable jury could find that a
substantial similarity existed between the motion picture and the
television movie and series, Orion's retroactive copyright transfer
to CBS defeated the claim of infringement."
The plaintiff
contended that a condition precedent existed which must have
been satisfied before Orion could transfer any of the rights it
reserved for itself: Orion had to have received approval from the
producer, 1818 Productions, which granted Orion its bundle of
rights in the first place. 1 Because Orion did not do so, the
plaintiff asserted that its transfer of rights to CBS for the television
movie and series violated basic copyright law. 2 Additionally, the
plaintiff argued that the retroactive license in and of itself was
invalid as a matter of law. 3 The court, however, disagreed,
finding that the requirement for approval from 1818 Productions
was merely a covenant of the parties' agreement and not a
condition precedent. 4 With regard to the retroactive copyright
transfer, the court held that CBS's programs did not infringe the
plaintiff's copyright because "a retroactive license can cure past
infringements."55
Thus, since Orion retained its rights in
television, it could validly enact a retroactive transfer to CBS,
thereby defeating Lone Wolf McQuade's action for copyright
infringement. 6

48. Id. at 591. The purchase agreement between Orion and the plaintiff was

made in 1983. Id.
49. Id. at 591-92. Norris was also the star of plaintiff's motion picture "Lone
Wolf McQuade." Id.

50. Id. at 595, 597.
51. Lone Wolf, 961 F. Supp. at 595.

52. Id. It is well understood within copyright law that one cannot transfer
more rights than he initially holds. See NIMMER, supra note § 6.11.
53. Lone Wolf, 961 F. Supp. at 597.

54. Id. at 596. Because of this finding, 1818 Productions could sue for
damages, but the current action by the plaintiff on this point was misplaced. Id.

at 596-97.
55. Id. at 597.
56. Id. at 598.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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In Country Road Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., one of the many
suits57 filed against one-time online giant MP3.com, the court held
that the unambiguous language of the settlement agreement
created a retroactive reproduction license that cured past
infringement by MP3.com 8 The plaintiff in this case was a
copyright holder in songs that the defendant had purchased and
then copied onto its servers, allowing online visitors to its website
to store, customize, and listen to these recordings at any time. 9
When the Harry Fox Agency ("HFA"), which co-owned some of
the songs in question, negotiated the aforementioned settlement
agreement with the defendant MP3.com, the retroactive verbiage
of the agreement effectively nullified the plaintiffs claim as to
those specific songs.6" The court found that it did not matter that
the word "license" was absent from the agreement; the plain
meaning of the agreement was clearly understood to grant to
MP3.com a valid, retroactive license. 6'
57. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Teevee Toons, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 546
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Zomba Enters., Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6831, 2001
WL 770926 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2001).
58. Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). The language of the agreement was as follows:
Effective upon the Effective Date, HFA, for and on behalf of
further agrees that any
the Settling HFA-Releasors,
Copyrighted Works owned or controlled by the HFAReleasors which were previously copied by MP3.com in
connection with its My.MP3.com service shall be deemed to
have been copied with each of the HFA-Releasor's respective
consent.

Id. at 329.
59. Self, supra note 5, at 70 (discussing MP3.com litigation).
60. Country Rd. Music, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (citing Copyright.Net Music
Publ'g LLC v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 7321, 2003 WL 740757 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 4, 2003) ("The language on its face constitutes a release of all "previously
copied" works "owned or controlled by the HFA-Releasors." It is thus, in
effect, a retroactive license.")).
61. Id. at 329. The court stated as follows:
Neither the absence of the word "license," nor extrinsic
evidence, nor the custom and practice of the industry alters the
unambiguous meaning of the above-quoted provision. Nor is
it significant that the settlement agreement does not explicitly
refer to non-signatory co-publishers, for "a license from a coPublished by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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In SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures Corp., the
court found that the defendants' use of a settlement agreement
involving a retroactive license, which was subject to a favorable
outcome in the case, was an acceptable agreement, and thus
eliminated the plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim.62 The
original composers of the composition, "Pepino, The Italian
Mouse," transferred all of their present and future rights in the
composition to another agency in exchange for royalties; the rights
were made assignable without restriction.63
After several
subsequent transfers, all of which were recorded with the
Copyright Office or otherwise publicly recorded, SBK Catalogue
Partnership ended up with a 50% ownership in the composition.'
A song on the soundtrack to Orion Picture Corporation's movie,
"Broadway Danny Rose," later infringed upon the copyright in
"Pepino."6 5 After months of negotiations, SBK and Orion reached
a settlement agreement, the execution of which was contingent
upon a favorable outcome in the case; as such, no written
agreement was prepared.66 Even though it was not in writing, the
court recognized the retroactive agreement, stating that "[a]ny use
of [the infringing song] is subject to the retroactive license, and
thus [it] can no longer be characterized as an infringing work."67

holder of a copyright immunizes the licensee from liability to
the other co-holder for copyright infringement."
Id. at 329-330 (quoting McKay v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 324 F.2d 762,
763 (2d Cir. 1963).
62. SBK Catalogue P'ship v. Orion Pictures Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053, 1072
(D.N.J. 1989).
63. Id. at 1057. After receiving the assignment, the agency (Romance Music,
Inc.) assigned fifty percent of this interest to a third party. Id. Both Romance
Music and this third party then applied for, and received, a joint registration of
the composition copyright. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1057-58.
66. Id. at 1059. Essentially, as long as the plaintiffs' claims were defeated,
SBK would transfer to Orion a retroactive license for Orion's use of the
"Pepino" composition in its movie but, until a decision was handed down in the
case, no written license would be drawn up. Id. The court found that SBK was
within its rights as joint owner of a copyright to grant a retroactive license to
Orion. Id.
67. Id. at 1072. Additionally, "a publisher with exclusive rights over the
distribution of an author's work does not commit a breach of trust by engaging
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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In Kramer v. Thomas, an unreported case in California, the
district court distinguished Leicester (discussed infra) and found
that the retroactive nature of a license transfer from valid copyright
holders did not serve to invalidate the transfer.68 The families of
deceased band members, who had contributed to the compositions
and whose ownership passed to their families upon their death,
granted the defendants in Kramer retroactive copyright licenses in
the compositions of fourteen songs.69 The court held that, since
the families were valid co-owners, they could transfer nonexclusive retroactive licenses to whomever they wished and the
70
retroactive nature of such a transfer did not invalidate it.
A district court in Tennessee, in Great Southern Homes, Inc. v.
Johnson & Thompson Realtors, held that a signed writing,
memorializing an earlier oral transfer agreement, related back to
this oral agreement and defeated defendant's claim that the
plaintiffs were not copyright holders and thus had no standing to
sue. 71 The plaintiffs in Great Southern Homes were designers and
licensors of house plans, and one of the defendants was to be the
exclusive sales agent for the homes.7"
After the plaintiffs
terminated their agreement, they alleged that the defendants copied
the plans and constructed the homes without the plaintiffs'
consent.73 The defendants claimed that because the license granted
in acts which may indirectly tend to diminish the value of the copyrighted
property, including the promotion of a competing work." Id. Thus, even though
SBK's retroactive license would effectively serve to promote Orion's infringing
song, the license was still valid, "absent deliberate tortuous conduct." Id.
68. Kramer v. Thomas, No. CV 05-8381, 2006 WL 4729242, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 28, 2006). Leicester was distinguished on the grounds that the
retroactive license there was found invalid because the defendant possessed a

non-exclusive license and had transferred its rights to another party, which is not
permitted. Id. The court stated that the Leicester court's refusal to accept
retroactive licenses as valid "is contrary to the great weight of authority cited by
Defendant," and declined to follow its holding. Id.
69. Id. at *7. The joint ownership of the copyrights transferred to the
deceased members' families automatically. Id.
70. Id. at *8.
71. Great Southern Homes, Inc. v. Johnson & Thompson Realtors, 797 F.
Supp. 609, 612 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
72. Id. at 609-610.
73. Id. at 610. Plaintiffs allege copyright infringement of the original home
designs. Id.
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by the plaintiff-designer to the plaintiff-licensor/marketer ("Great
Southern") was an oral agreement to begin with and was written
down much later, Great Southern was not a valid owner.7 4 The
court declined to agree with the defendants, finding instead that,
first, § 204(a) of the Copyright Act was intended to operate like
the Statute of Frauds and was not intended to "operate for the

benefit of a third-party infringer when there is no dispute between
the owner and transferee," and, second, that the later signed
writing of the transfer relates back to the time of the oral
agreement, thus rendering the transfer valid. 7
Thus, districts across the country have consistently ruled on the
appropriateness of retroactive licensing agreements as an integral

aspect of copyright law. The granting of a license, by a co-owner
who was lawfully entitled to grant such a license, could involve

granting a past, present, or future interest, no matter the rationale
behind such a transfer.76
C. Listening to the Wind of Change: " A New Directionfor
Retroactive Licenses
On October 5, 2007, the Second Circuit handed down its
decision in Davis v. Blige, essentially wiping retroactive licenses
off the map, at least in the Second Circuit.7 ' The decision is not
74. Id. at610-11.
75. Id. at 611-12. The court relied on Nimmer with regard to its decision:
The provision [in 17 U.S.C. § 204(a)] that as an alternative to
an "instrument of conveyance" there may be "a note or
memorandum of the transfer" apparently codifies the judge
made rule under the 1909 Act that if a prior oral grant is
subsequently confirmed in writing, this will validate the grant
ab initio as of the time of the oral grant.
Id. at 612 (quoting NIMMER supra note 7, § 10.03[A]) (citations omitted)).
76. For example, in Kramer v. Thomas, it did not matter if there were
seemingly innocent intentions behind the retroactive transfer. See supra notes
67-69 and accompanying text. In Silberstein v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., the
court's decision was not affected although the rationale behind the transfer was
essentially to prevent another alleged owner from bringing suit. See supra notes
36-43 and accompanying text.
77. Reference to SCORPION, WIND OF CHANGE (Mercury 1990).
78. Davis v. Blige (Davis I1), 505 F.3d 90, 104 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[A] license
or assignment in copyright can only act prospectively.").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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without some degree of controversy,79 but before examining that
controversy, this article first addresses how the court reached its
conclusion.
Leicester v. Warner Bros. appears to be as good of a place to
start as any.8 ° In that case, the plaintiff, Leicester, designed a
sculpture for the outside of a building owned by R&T in Los
Angeles. 8 ' John Hayes, the main architect for the firm hired by
R&T, commissioned Leicester as the sole artist and held coWarner
ownership with Leicester in the finished product.82
Brothers subsequently approached R&T for its permission to use
the building (sans most of Leicester's sculpture) in its movie
"Batman Forever," and R&T granted it permission without asking
Leicester or the architect. 83 Hayes, the architect, attempted to
grant R&T a retroactive license permitting it to sublicense the right
to reproduce Leicester's work. 84 The court first rejected this
attempted retroactive transfer on the grounds that only an
exclusive license vests the right to sublicense with the licensee,
and any transfer of rights by one co-owner, following established
copyright principles, may only result in a non-exclusive license; as
Blog,
e.g.
William
Patry:
The
Patry
Copyright
79. See,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/search?q=Blige (last visited Oct. 19, 2007).
80. Leicester v. Warner Bros., No. CV 95-4058, 1998 WL 34016724 (C.D.
Cal. May 29, 1998).
81. Id. at*1.
82. Id. The agreement between Leicester and R&T stated the following:
The Artist retains all rights under the Copyright Act of 1976.
. . and all other rights in and to the Phase B portion of the
Work . . . [t]he Artist shall not make any duplicate, threedimensional reproductions of the final Work, nor shall the
Artist grant permission to others to do so. The Artist grants to

the Owner, and to the Owner's related corporate entities, and
to the Owner's assigns a perpetual irrevocable license to make
reproductions of the work including but not limited to
reproductions used in advertising, brochures, media publicity,

and catalogs or other similar publications ....
Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *2. The agreement between R&T and Warner Bros. granted
Warner Bros. "permission to make replicas or pictorial representations of the
R&T property in connection with the making of the Batman Forever movie."
Id. Warner Bros. ended up creating a three-dimensional model of the building,
as well as items to promote the movie. Id.
84. Id. at* 5.
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such, R&T had no authority to sublicense any rights to Warner

Bros.85 Additionally, the court rejected "the idea that the earlier
infringement [could] be retroactively validated by the later grant of
the license." 6
In

an

unreported

case,

Encore Entertainment, LLC

v.

KIDdesigns, Inc., the District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee opted to follow Leicester in finding retroactive licenses
invalid to cure past infringement.8 7 The court stated that "[t]o find
otherwis[e] would promote a scenario whereby individuals would
be permitted, if not encouraged, to willingly infringe upon a
copyright interest until caught and then, once caught, simply apply
for a retroactive license to avoid liability for earlier
infringement."88 In this case, the defendant manufactured and sold
audio and video products for children such as karaoke machines,
karaoke boom boxes, and personal tape players.8 9 These products
were sold with compilations of various musical compositions,
some of which the plaintiffs had a copyright interest in.9"
Defendant KIDdesigns alleged that its co-defendant, Priddis,

which was responsible for obtaining the necessary permission for
the songs used for the compilations, was supposed to indemnify
KIDdesigns against any infringement claims; additionally, Priddis

claimed that it received a retroactive license to cover all past
infringement from the HFA, co-owner in the copyrights to the

85. Id. Even with an explicit statement providing for sub-licensing rights in
the transfer agreement, the defendant still could not do so as it was only
transferred a non-exclusive right which does not carry with it the right to sublicense; thus, the purported conveyance from Hayes was attempting to convey
more rights than he owned, which goes against established copyright law. Id.
86. Leicester, 1998 WL 34016724, at *6. The court fails to explain why it
rejects the notion of retroactive copyright licenses. It merely stated that if
certain conduct was an infringement at the time of the conduct, it could not be
later validated by the grant of the license." See id. The fact that Warner Bros.
had no valid license to use the building in its movie at the time it was filming
could not be cured by a later attempt to retroactively transfer such a license. Id.
87. Encore Entm't, LLC v. KIDdesigns, Inc., No. 3:03 1129, 2005 WL
2249897, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 2005).
88. Id. at *10.
"Such a scheme would plainly contradict the purposes
underlying federal copyright law." Id.
89. Id. at*1.
90. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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compositions. 9 Though the court here agreed with the Leicester
court in holding that retroactive licenses do not cure past
infringement, this case is distinguishable from Leicester because
the electronic retroactive licenses obtained by the defendant
Priddis were revoked by the HFA, and thus, no retroactive licenses
92
existed at the time of the decision.
The court also cited David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc.
in its decision, where the District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that a retroactive application for licensing by the
defendants in 1984, when they could have applied for re-licensing
at least four years prior, was not a defense to the plaintiffs
copyright infringement claim.93 Again, however, this case is
distinguishable from Leicester in that at issue here was an
application for a retroactive license and not an actual grant of a
retroactive license.94
Thus, while most courts found that retroactive licenses were a
sufficient way to fix past infringement, a few viewed such licenses
as improper. However, it is important to note that all of these
decisions were in U.S. District Courts and that prior to October 5,
2007, there was no Circuit Court authority to guide the lower
courts in their decisions. This, of course, has since changed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. It's a Family Affair: The Second CircuitDecision
Davis v. Blige ("Davis Ir') is the first opinion from a federal

9 1. Id. at *2-3.
92. Id. at *10.

The argument "has dissolved into a legal nullity . . .[but]

even if such retroactive licenses remained in existence and were curative in
nature," defendant Priddis's conduct may have still fallen "outside the territorial
scope of even these retroactive licenses" because of the international nature of
the case (master recordings were sent from Priddis to Hong Kong, where they
were

reproduced, packaged,

marketed, and

distributed

domestically

and

internationally). Id. at *2, 10.
93. Encore Entm't, 2005 WL 2249897, at * 10 (citing David v. Showtime/The
Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
94. David, 697 F. Supp. at 764 (emphasis added).
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court of appeals addressing the validity of retroactive transfers.9 5
On appeal from the Southern District of New York, which granted
summary judgment to the defendants, the Second Circuit plainly
held that "a license or assignment in copyright can only act
prospectively." 96
In Davis II, the plaintiff, Davis, alleged that she was a co-author
of two songs, "L.O.V.E." and "Don't Trade in My Love," and
claimed that these songs were substantially similar to two songs
that appeared on Mary J. Blige's 2001 multi-platinum album "No
More Drama" (as "LOVE" and "Keep It Moving," respectively).97
Davis alleged that she co-wrote these two compositions with Bruce
Chambliss in 1998,98 and that Bruce Miller, Chambliss's son and
Blige's brother, later approached her, wanting to buy several songs
from her for Blige's use, including L.O.V.E. 99 Davis declined and
subsequently registered the works with the United States
Copyright Office in 2002 and filed suit over a year later.1"' Miller,
one of the defendants, alleged that Chambliss was the sole author
of the songs and orally transferred his rights to Miller, who
registered the songs "LOVE" and "Keep it Moving" with the
Copyright Office in 2001.10 Miller and Chambliss converted this
oral agreement into a written document one day before Chambliss
was to give his deposition in this case; the written agreement stated
that Chambliss transferred "an undivided one hundred percent...
share in and to all the undersigned's right, title and interest [in the
songs] . . . [and] any and all causes of action for infringement for
the same past, present, and future ....
The district court found that although it was possible that an oral
agreement between Miller and Chambliss never actually existed,
95. Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Davis I1].
96. Id. at 104.

97. Id. at 94.
98. Id. Chambliss denies that he ever collaborated with Davis on any works.
Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 94-95.
101. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 95. The court notes, however, "the existence and
nature of the alleged oral agreement is in dispute."

Id.

The deposition

testimony from the two men "contain[ed] inconsistent descriptions of the nature
and timing of the alleged oral agreement." Id. at 95 n.5.
102. Id. at 96.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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the fact that there was a retroactive written agreement made that
finding moot, quoting Silberstein in saying "[a] retroactive license
can cure past infringements."'' 3 The Second Circuit, however,
disagreed, relying on a bevy of legal theories in holding retroactive
licenses invalid as a matter of law. After explaining basic
copyright law, the court stated that the cases relied upon by the
district court in coming to its conclusion were distinguishable from
the instant case because they involved retroactive licenses granted
pursuant to settlement negotiations.' °4 Settlement agreements, it
said, recognize the infringement, whereas a retroactive license
"erase[s] the unauthorized use from history [extinguishing] the
nonparty co-owner's right to sue. . . .""' The court then examined
retroactive licenses under tort and contract law to determine
whether they were consistent with the co-owner's right to sue for
infringement. 06
Under tort law, upon an injury the injured party may sue for all
damages - past, present, and future - so a retroactive assignment
or license, according to the court, "destroys the co-owner's
valuable and vested right to enforce her claim.0 7 Under contract
law, the court stated that a retroactive license violates the
fundamental contract law principle that prohibits contractual
parties from binding non-parties to the contract; further, if a coowner can effectively eliminate his co-owner's right to sue with a
retroactive license, this is conveying more than that co-owner
103. Davis v. Blige, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter
Davis 1] (quoting Silberstein v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 616,
629 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
104. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 101 (citing Country Rd. Music, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 325, 328 (agreeing with defendant that a "settlement

agreement between [defendant and co-owner] granted defendant retroactive
reproduction rights that bar any infringement claim by plaintiffs [co-owners]");
SBK Catalogue P'ship v. Orion Pictures Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (D.N.J.

1989) ("The [settlement] agreement contemplated a retroactive written license
for the use of the musical composition .... "); Lone Wolf McQuade Assocs. v.
CBS Inc., 961 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In a settlement agreement

dated December 9, 1996, [co-owner] granted [defendant] a retroactive license
from January 1, 1990.")).
105. Id. at 103.
106. See id. at 103-04.
107. Id. at 103 (quoting Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d

Cir. 1980)).
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possesses.' 8 The court also relied on patent law to add support to
its holding because of the tendency of courts to look from one to
the other when in need of precedent.' 9
Finally, the court offered a policy rationale: retroactive licenses
would go against the intent of the Copyright Act by making
transactions uncertain and unpredictable, and would encourage
infringement instead of the creation of original works."' Relying
on the totality of the rationale, from tort law to contract law to
patent law, the court concluded that the written agreement between
Miller and Chambliss could not bar an infringement action from
Davis, thus reversing the decision of the district court."'
108. Id. at 103. Because a co-owner cannot convey more than what he owns,
the court interprets this basic tenet of copyright law to include the inability of a
co-owner to convey his other co-owners right to sue for infringement - in other
words, because when a co-owner assigns his rights to a third party he also
effectively insulates the third party against a lawsuit from another co-owner, the
court determines that this insulation is a right that goes beyond the bundle of
rights the co-owner initially held. See id. at 103-04.
109. Id. at 104 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (referring to the "historic kinship between patent law and
copyright law")). The court determined that its holding here in Davis II was
consistent with established patent law:
[T]he grant of a license by one co-owner cannot deprive the
other co-owner of the right to sue for accrued damages for
past infringement. That would require a release, not a license,
and the rights of a patent co-owner, absent agreement to the
contrary, do not extend to granting a release that would defeat
an action by other co-owners to recover damages for past
infringement.
Id. (quoting Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
110. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 104-05 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989); Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp., 745 F.2d
142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984)).
111. Id. at 107. The court held the following:
Miller had no right to use or license the disputed compositions
at the time they were used on the Album or at the time he
licensed them to the third-party defendants. The third-party
defendants are, in turn, potentially liable for infringement to
Davis because they never obtained a legitimate right to use the
disputed compositions. . . Chambliss's alleged retroactive
assignment to Miller of the disputed compositions, for
consideration of one dollar each, would have the effect of
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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Furthermore, the court held that even if an oral agreement did
exist, the written agreement between Miller and Chambliss still
could not serve to defeat Davis's claim of infringement: the oral
agreement was not a legal agreement since under the Copyright
Act of 1976, a transfer of copyright ownership must be signed; the
retroactive written agreement was thus inconsequential since the
infringement had already occurred. 2
B. A Decision That Was Against All Odds?"3
In its decision, the Second Circuit expressly went against the
bulk of existing case law in which courts consistently held that
retroactive transfers were acceptable. One critic of the case said,
"[t]he [Davis II] decision opens up to challenge untold numbers of
settlement agreements, and even more broadly eliminates one of
the central tenets of the 1976 Act: the alienability of one coowner's rights without the permission of the other co-author(s)."' 4
Furthermore, the case calls into question the legality of oral
agreements for non-exclusive license transfers. Proponents of the
decision appear to be unfazed by the weight given by the court to
the policy considerations." 5 So what was the tipping point for this
decision?
It appears that the court awarded the most weight to the heavy
policy concerns surrounding retroactive transfers, but disguised
this by discussing tort, contract, and patent law propositions that
support its decision. Granted, the policy concerns are important,
as the purpose of copyright law is not to promote infringement or
unraveling valuable accrued infringement claims against not
only the retroactive assignee (Miller) but also his licensees.
Id. at 105-06.
112. Id. at 107-08. "If there was no written agreement.. .defendants had no
legal right to use the disputed compositions, and Davis's right to sue for
infringement accrued." Id. at 107; see also 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2006).
113. Reference to PHIL COLLINS, AGAINST ALL ODDS (Atlantic/WEA 1984).
114. The Patry Copyright Blog, The Second Circuit Goes to the Dark Side,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/10/second-circuit-goes-to-dark-side.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
115. See On The Cover Songs, Mary J., Pay to Play,
http://onthecoversongs.blogspot.com/2007/10/mary-j-pay-to-play.html
(last
visited Mar. 23, 2008).
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to make it easier for infringers to actually infringe, but rather to
promote creation and originality." 6 However, a conclusion of
judicial activism may be inferred from the combination of the
court's reliance on policy considerations and a rather weak
substantive argument in which it refused to apply the albeit nonprecedential but nonetheless rather overwhelming prior case
law. 117
The case law, the court stated, was distinguishable because, in
the cases cited, the retroactive license was part of a settlement
agreement, which "recognizes the unauthorized use while
providing a remedy . . . that is acceptable to all parties to the
agreement."18
Settlement
agreements
are
"generally
retrospective," says the court, but are not to be used to prejudice a
co-owner not party to the agreement." 9 Licenses and assignments,
though, are "prospective ....
A retroactive license or assignment
purports to authorize a past use that was originally unauthorized..
[and would] erase the unauthorized use from history ... ."120
Because the unauthorized use would have resulted in an
infringement suit by a co-owner, the co-owner would lose out on
its right to sue, and because of this loss of a right, the court delved
into a brief undertaking of basic tort and contract law,' 2 ' all the
while seeming to forget the basics of copyright law: that a coowner may transfer any of his rights, in whole or in part, by any
means of conveyance.' 22
The district court recognized this right in its Davis I decision,'2 3
116. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 105 (quoting Diamond v. Am-Law Publ'g Corp.,
745 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984)).
117. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 13 (1990) ("It is a proper part of the
judicial function to make law as a necessary by-product of the process of
deciding actual cases and controversies. But to reach out so blatantly and
unnecessarily to make new law in a case of this kind is unabashed judicial
activism.").
118. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 103.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(l) (2006). Thus, there is no statutory prohibition on
retroactive transfers of copyright; as long as the co-owner possesses a certain
right, he may transfer it to a third party without recourse, according to the

statute.
123. Davis I, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[A] co-owner has
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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Nimmer explains it in his treatise,' 24 and countless other courts
have followed the statutory provision and subsequent case law
explanations. While the Second Circuit here does not negate this
right, it unnecessarily qualifies it to be only a certain type of right
- one that appears to be utilized only when fairness and equity
preside. 25 It is out of this unqualified right to transfer that the
retroactive license came to exist, and it is in this qualified right to
transfer that the Second Circuit has put the kibosh on the
retroactive license. In qualifying the right, the court relied heavily
on policy: sure, co-owners may transfer what they own, but in
doing so, they may not prejudice their other co-owners. 26 This
appears to be an extension of the accepted limitation that a coowner may not transfer more than what he owns - which leads into
the concept of exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.
The court accepted that the retroactive license attempt from
Chambliss to Miller was a non-exclusive license, if only by
process of elimination: to be an exclusive license, all co-owners
must agree on the transfer of right(s); thus, since Davis did not
consent to the transfer, Miller obtained a non-exclusive license
from Chambliss. 27 The commonly accepted tenet of copyright
law, though, that non-exclusive licenses are not required to be in
writing, is conspicuously absent from the opinion.'28 In fact, the
a legal right to grant a license in a work without another co-owner's permission
or to transfer his rights in the copyright freely.").
124. NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.11 ("In the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, one joint owner may always transfer his interest in the joint work to a
third party, subject only to the general requirements of a valid transfer of
copyright.").
125. See Davis II, 505 F.3d at 105-06. "The core purpose of copyright law is
to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor' and thereby 'to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." Id. at 105 (quoting Veeck v. S.
Bldg. Code Congress Int'l Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.2001)). "[T]he grant
of a license by one co-owner cannot deprive the other co-owner of the right to
sue for accrued damages for past infringement." Id. (quoting Schering Corp. v.
Roussel-UCLAF SA, 104 F.3d 341, 345 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
126. Id. at 102 ( "One tenant in common can settle for or release his interest
in . . . personal property, but he cannot settle for or release the interest of his

cotenants. If one tenant in common should settle for his portion of the damages
before action, the other may sue without joining him.").
127. Id. at 99-100.
128. See, e.g., Foad Consulting Group, Inc. v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 825Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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court limited its discussion of the alleged oral agreement to a mere
paragraph and, instead, focused on the written agreement and the
interplay with established copyright law. 129 Citing ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd. to initiate the discussion of
transferable rights, the court noted that "[t]he right to prosecute an
accrued cause of action for infringement is also an incident of
copyright ownership."' 3 This statement, however, does not tell
the whole story. What the ABKCO court actually said, referencing
17 U.S.C. § 501(b), was that the owner of an exclusive right is
entitled to prosecute for infringement. 3 '
This right to prosecute for infringement of an exclusive right
corresponds with the concept that co-owners of a copyright may
not sue each other for infringement, because neither co-owner is in
sole possession of an exclusive right, which is why all co-owners
must agree to transfer an exclusive right to a third party.' 32 In
26 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We have recognized ... that Section 204(a)'s writing
requirement applies only to the transfer of exclusive rights; grants of
nonexclusive copyright licenses need not be in writing . . . [a] nonexclusive

license may be granted orally or by implication."); Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess
Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997) ("While the Copyright
Act requires that exclusive licenses be evidenced by a writing, no such writing
requirement applies to nonexclusive licenses."); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck,
110 F.3d 749, 752 (11th Cir. 1997) ("In contrast to an exclusive license, a
nonexclusive license to use a copyright may be granted orally, or may even be
implied from conduct.") (internal quotations omitted); I.A.E. Inc. v. Shaver, 74
F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A copyright owner may transfer to another
person any of the exclusive rights the owner has in the copyright; however, such
a transfer must be made in writing."); MacLean Assocs, Inc. v. Wm.M. MercerMeidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The owner of a
copyright can transfer ownership of the copyright by selling it or exclusively
licensing it . . . [e]xclusive licenses must, however, be in writing."); Effects

Assocs, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Section 204 [of the
Copyright Act] provides that all transfers of copyright ownership must be in
writing; Section 101 defines transfers of ownership broadly, but expressly
removes from the scope of Section 204 a 'nonexclusive license."'); NIMMER,
supra note 7, § 10.02[B][5] ("It remains true that nonexclusive licenses may be
valid although oral or implied [by conduct].").
129. See Davis II, 505 F.3d at 98-102.
130. Id. at 99. (citing ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944
F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991)).
131. ABKCO Music, 944 F.2d at 980 (emphasis added).
132. See Davis I, 505 F.3d at 99.
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applying its policy rationale for defeating retroactive licenses, the
court relies on this "right to prosecute," but this reliance is
misplaced since a non-exclusive license, which, as has been
established, does not require a written agreement, was at issue
here. 3"' 3 Additionally, the Southern District of New York had
previously held that a subsequent writing to commemorate an
earlier oral agreement satisfied the requirement that copyright
transfers must be in writing, so either way, it would appear that the
defendants were covered.'3 4 In ignoring this seemingly convincing
weight of prior case law, the Second Circuit has potentially opened
the door to an influx of lawsuits regarding alleged retroactive
licenses and one question must be asked: was creating the rule that
retroactive licenses are never acceptable the best move, especially
in a circuit heavy with entertainment and intellectual property
litigation?
IV. IMPACT
While this case is not binding on other circuits, it will most
certainly serve as persuasive authority in an area where the
Supreme Court has not weighed in. The Second Circuit assumes
that its opinion's impact in the field will be nothing short of
beneficial to copyright owners, since it purports to protect their
rights to sue for infringement.' 35 The Second Circuit, however,
also appears to assume that all retroactive licenses are granted for
some deceitful purpose.' 36 Of course, instances where another coowner has no issue with the granting of a retroactive license most
likely never see a courtroom; however, the sweeping holding of
the Second Circuit, that a license may only act prospectively,
would effectively eliminate successful retroactive licenses as well
133. Id. at 103.
134. Davis 1, 419 F. Supp. 2d 493, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., Inc. No 80 CIV. 2242, 1984 WL 2120, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1984)).
135. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 103. A co-owner's right to sue for infringement
"is one of the most valuable 'sticks' of the 'bundle of rights' of copyright. Id.

136. Id. ("A retroactive license or assignment purports to authorize a past use
that was originally unauthorized ...a retroactive license or assignment would if given legal effect - erase the unauthorized use from history with the result

that the nonparty co-owner's right to sue for infringement... is extinguished.").
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as those possibly granted with a malicious intent in mind.
As an example, assume there are two co-owners to a work. For
the ease of this example, let us assume these co-owners are a
married couple. The husband decides to transfer his interest in the
work to one of the couple's friends while his wife retains her
interest; however, the husband, unfamiliar with the law, merely
orally transfers his rights to the friend. Things progress nicely for
years without incident. Somewhere along the line, the husband is
alerted that he needs to commemorate in writing his earlier oral
agreement with his friend and does so by way of a retroactive
license, dating back to the initial oral transfer. Let us say the
couple subsequently dies and the wife's interest then transfers to
their child. The child does not like his co-owner and subsequently
learns of the retroactive license. Since the child is knowledgeable
of the Davis II decision, the child hauls the co-owner into court
where the court finds the retroactive license is essentially a legal
nullity. In this case, there was no initial infringement, or ill will,
or bad faith or anything of the like; rather, there existed the
innocent, good faith attempt of a copyright holder to transfer his
rights to friend, which backfired upon his death.
Granted, the Second Circuit could distinguish a case like this
from Davis II on the grounds of intent of the parties or the proof of
an actual oral agreement (where in Davis I the district court
concluded that "a reasonable jury could find an oral agreement
never existed between Chambliss and Miller").'37 But then this
turns into yet another "where do you draw the line" situation.
With the sweeping declaration that "a license or assignment in
copyright can only act prospectively" the Second Circuit has
corralled itself into being nothing short of a line-drawing body, as
evidenced by the public policy reasons given by the court. 38
137. Davis 1, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 498.
138. Davis II, 505 F.3d at 104. Policy reasons offered by the court in
reaching its conclusion include the following:
A rule permitting retroactive assignments and transfers would
inject uncertainty and unpredictability into copyright
ownership, contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting the
Copyright Act of 1976 . . . [i]f retroactive transfers and
licenses were permissible, one could never reliably and
definitively determine if and when an infringement occurred,
because an infringement could be "undone" by the very sort
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/5
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What seems to be a more effective way to deal with the problem
of retroactive licenses is to look at each on a case-by-case basis.
From the facts of each case, a court should be able to determine
the trustworthiness of the parties, at least to some extent. For
example, in Davis II, the Second Circuit agreed with the district
court that "a reasonable jury could find an oral agreement never
existed between Chambliss and Miller."' 39 Instead of leaping from
the oral agreement to the written retroactive license, the court
could have analyzed this aspect a bit more, rather than simply
dismissing it in a mere sentence and moving on to what the Second
Circuit apparently felt were more appropriate topics - tort law,
contract law, patent law, and policy concerns. Policy concerns are
indeed important but, again, the judiciary needs to be careful that it
does not cross yet another line in judicial activism. Additionally,
in making a policy-backed decision, courts should consider all
viable alternatives to the ruling before handing down an allencompassing holding that will force it to engage in further line
drawing. All the Second Circuit needed to do in Davis 11 was
qualify its holding to a narrow situation - for example, where a
question of fact exists about the original oral agreement, a
retroactive license may not insulate co-owners from infringement
suits by another co-owner. This would require the courts to take a
look at each individual case, instead of the issuance of a broad
statement neatly condemning retroactivity with regard to copyright
licenses and transfers.'40
Admittedly, it is nice to have black letter law. It is often helpful
to know where the proverbial line is, and just how much can be
done before crossing it - at least for your client's sake. However,
in drawing this line, courts must be aware of the potential rights
that they are trammeling. Is it worth it, to effectively limit
statutorily-given freedoms to copyright owners or licensees? Prior
to Davis II, the only real limit on a co-owner's ability to distribute
his rights to a third party involved obtaining his co-owner's
consent before allowing another party to hold an exclusive right;
now, a co-owner is unable to orally grant a non-exclusive license
of maneuver attempted by defendants in this case.
Id. at 105.
139. Id. at 101 (quoting Davis I, 419 F. Supp. 2d at 498).
140. Id. at 104.
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and later memorialize it with a written retroactive license, even
though oral grants of non-exclusive licenses are a perfectly
acceptable method of transfer.
The decision runs against
established statutory and case law and, quite frankly, this
established law should not be overruled by the Second Circuit's
policy concerns and issues with fairness to co-owners.
Of course, protecting co-owners and, more importantly, the
creation of copyrights, is important and is a main tenet of
copyright law.14' But the Second Circuit here focused its decision
on the co-owner that does not transfer his rights. What of the coowner who does transfer his rights? The court seemed to ignore
the fact that this co-owner is equally protected by the Copyright
Act and thus has the right to transfer his portion of ownership to a
third party if he should so desire.' 42 Why the court determined that
one co-owner's rights were more important than another is a
mystery, but it appears to be grounded in the policy concerns
mentioned above. In deciding any case, a court must determine
which party's interest outweighs the other. This determination,
though, should not be made before the trier of facts actually gets to
hear the facts - and the holding in Davis II prevents this from
happening by effectively stating that one party's interests
inherently supersede the other party's rights to transfer. Thus, at
the risk of sounding like a broken record (pun intended), the
Second Circuit should have either (1) qualified its holding to the
narrow instance in the case or (2) ruled that, going forward,
retroactive licenses are to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
with the court looking at all aspects of the case before making its
decision on whose interests trump whose.
V. CONCLUSION

The Copyright Act of 1976 established some basic tenets for the
transferability of copyrights by joint owners in a work. The Act
does not, however, say anything about the viability of a retroactive
141.

Bong v. Alfred S. Campbell Art. Co., 214 U.S. 236, 245 (1909) ("[Tihe

statute must be read in the light of the intention of Congress to protect this
intangible right as a reward of the inventive genius that has produced the
work.").
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006).
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license from one joint owner to a third party, thereby nullifying
any potential lawsuit from the other joint owner, since co-owners
in a copyright may not sue each other. The transfer from one coowner to a third party is a non-exclusive transfer of rights, as an
exclusive transfer requires the conveyance of all co-owners. A
non-exclusive license is not required to be in writing, while an
exclusive license must be written to be valid.
Courts across the country have consistently held that retroactive
licenses are valid transfers under the commonly held legal
construction that a co-owner may transfer all rights that he has to a
third party - he just may not transfer anything more than what he
possesses. In the only circuit court decision to date, the Second
Circuit went against the bulk of authority in finding retroactive
licenses invalid per se.. In so holding, the Second Circuit failed to
consider not only viable alternatives, such as considering each
instance on a case-by-case basis, but it also wiped out the ability of
co-owners to retroactively license their share in a work even if
their intentions are good.
Because of the established copyright law, including the wellestablished ability of a co-owner to transfer his rights to
whomever, and whenever, he wishes, the Second Circuit's position
is odd from a legal standpoint. In attempting to justify its decision,
the Second Circuit utilized a policy standpoint in explaining
essentially that it would not be fair to the other co-owner to have
one of its rights, the right to sue, quashed by his co-owner's ability
to retroactively transfer a license. The Second Circuit did not
contemplate that retroactive licenses could actually be used for
something beneficial. While a beneficial use may not be a likely
outcome, it is nonetheless possible, and should thus have been at
least considered before the Second Circuit explicitly ruled out the
use of all retroactive licenses.

Katie Idzik
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